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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

BARBARA J. WARREN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 17514

v.

ROBERT L. WARREN,
Defendant- Respondent.
---0000000--REPL Y BRIEF

Appellant Barbara J. Warren submits the following Reply Brief
in order to demonstrate certain factual errors contained within the
brief of respondent Robert L. Warren and to respond to new issues raised
in that Brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In his Brief, !\tr. Warren grossly overstates the income
available to Appellant.

Beginning with the second paragraph of his

Statement of Facts (Resp. Br. at 3), Mr. Warren insistently claims that
~!rs.

Warren has available to her "a gross monthly income of $1,800."

He

calculates this amount as being the sum of $800 per month from her trust
(inherited from her father), the $400 per month short-term alimony
awarded by the trial court, and "$600 per month in stock dividends from
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shares of National Bancshares stock".

There is absolutely no evidence

in the Record to support any finding that

~.1rs.

Warren receives $600 per

month in stock dividends on top of her trust income.

In fact, these

bank shares have produced, at most, $600 per year.

(Exhibit 32-P and

R. at 575-581, Tr. at 201-207.)
Moreover, Mr. Warren claims in his brief (Resp. Br. at 4) that
!\frs. Warren's inheritance amounted to only $66,386.01 at the time of her
marriage.

I

The unrefuted testimony at the trial was, however, that

Mrs. Warren inherited approximately $200, 000.

CR. at 416, Tr. at 42.)

This inheritance was comprised of savings accounts, stocks, life
insurance policies, and a rental lot.

(_!!:!. ). It was from these

inherited funds that the parties purchased their first home in 1954 and
a second home in 1969.

(R. at 432, Tr. at 58.)

The downpayment ontt;

second home was $48, 500 and was provided solely from funds withdrawn
from Mrs. Warren's inheritance.

(_!!:!.)

Eventually, the sales proceeds

from this second home were used to create substantial equity in the
parties' present residence.

It was also Mrs. Warren's inheritance that

made possible the publication of Mr. Warren's book, "Utah's Biggest
Bucks".

CR. at 438, Tr. at 64.)

In short, as Mr. Warren acknowledges

in his Brief, !\1rs. Warren was compelled during the tenure of this

1

marriage to contribute well in excess of $146, 000 from her inheritance,
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l

much of which was used to provide the necessities of life, including
food, shelter, and utilities.
In attempting to justify the imposition upon Mrs. Warren of
more than two-thirds of the parties' outstanding obligations, Mr. Warren
asserts that these were charge card debts for which he was not
responsible.

(Resp. Br. at 21.)

In so doing, Mr. Warren conveniently

overlooks in his Brief that which he admitted in his testimony.

At

trial, he admitted that the obligations to Valley Bank and Trust
consisted of "check protection" advances to cover checking account
overdrafts.

(R. at 572, Tr. at 198.)

Ur. Warren further insists in his

brief that his pension and profit sharing, retirement and ESOP plans are
unavailable to him until retirement and as such have no present value.
However, they are available at the termination of his employment with
E-Systems, which has occured in connection with his attempt to enter a
void and prohibited marriage.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

RESPONDENT GROSSLY OVERSTATES THE

ACTUAL INCOME AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT.

Through some mathematical hocus-pocus, Mr. Warren attempts in
his Brief to demonstrate that Mrs. Warren actually has available to her
monthly income of $1, 800.

As noted in the Statement of Facts, above,
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this assertion is based, in part, upon the fallacious assur:iption that
Mrs. Warren receives $600 per r:ionth in dividends on bank stock.
is no evidence to support that assumption.

The!'

Moreover, the supposed

$1, 800 per month includes $400 per month in short-term alimony, which

will be discontinued in less than three years.

In fact, the evidence

presented at trial was that in 1979 Mrs. Warren's National Bancshares
generated interest income for the year of $568.40 and her trust
generated interest and dividends of $7 ,479.69 for a total gross income
of $8, 048. 09 or $670. 67 per month.

(Exhibit 32-P.)

Also, as

!'.1rs. Warren has been required to expend the principal of her trust to
pay debts (such as one-half of approximately $5, 000 in 1979 federal
taxes, as ordered by Judge Leary), the monthly income from the legacy
has actually been further diminished.
Respondent then unfairly compares the supposed pre-tax

$1,8~~

per month (which is actually never more than $1, 100 per month and will
drop to a paltry $700 per month in less than three years) with his
after-tax net income.

(Resp. Br. at 24.)

Mr. Warren carefully refrains

from mentioning that he actually has a gross income of in excess of
$40,000 per year.

(R. at 562, Tr. at 188.)

This amount does not

include bonuses, fringe benefits, and stock options, all of which have
been of considerable value to Mr. Warren in the past.
In actuality, a fair comparison indicates that !\1r. Warren has
monthly net income substantially in excess of $3, 300 while Mrs. Warren
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has monthly income (at the present time) of less than $1, 100, which will
drop to $700 in the near future.

In view of the fact that !\1r. Warren

was able to obtain a professional education by relying upon his wife's
inheritance and is now a lucratively employed professional while his
wife is a 49-year-old housewife and mother who has not been gainfully
employed in the last quarter century and has no marketable skills
whatsoever, the alimony awarded by the trial court is so insufficient as
to constitute an abuse of discretion.
As this Court has frequently recognized, it is the necessary
function of alimony to provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.

For

example, this Court noted in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218 (Utah
1980), that:

The function of alimony is to provide support for
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.
Criteria considered in determining a reasonable
award of support include the financial conditions
and needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to
provide a sufficient income for herself, and the
ability of the husband to provide support.
615 P.2d at 1223 (footnote citation omitted).

In this case, Mr. Warren

has the demonstrated ability to provide a lucrative income.

On the

other hand, Mrs. Warren, who is now almost 50 years of age, has no
employable skills and has not been employed in the past quarter century.
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..,
Both factors militate strongly in favor of a substantial alimony award.
In view of the long duration of the marriage, a long-term alimony award
is not only appropriate but essential to an equitable decree.
Similarly, in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). th,I
Court observed that the function of alimony
I

is to provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage • • •
Important criterin
determining a reasonable award for support and
maintenance are the financial conditions and needs
of the wife, considering her station in life; her
ability to produce sufficient income for herself;
and the ability of her husband to provide
support.
587 P.2d 147 (footnote citation omitted).

Likewise, in Wilson v.

Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), this Court, faced with a
15-year marriage, held that:
The court's responsibility is to endeavor to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of [the
parties'] economic resources so that the parties
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful
basis. In doing so, it is necessary for the court
to consider • • • an appraisal of all of the
attendant facts and circumstances; the duration of
the marriage; the ages of the parties; their social
positions and standards of living; their health;
considerations relative to children; the money and
property they possess and how it was acquired;
their capabilities and training and their present
and potential incomes.
296 P.2d at 979-80 (footnote citation omitted).

Again, each of these

factors demands a substantial and long-term award of alimony in view of
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the length of this marriage, the employability of Mrs. Warren, and the
demonstrated earning potential of Mr. Warren.
A similarly long-term marriage was before this Court in
llacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951).

This Court

articulated several factors to be considered in determining alimony:
(1)
The social position and standard of living of
each before the marriage •

(2)
The respective ages of the parties [at the
time of the marriage.]
(3)

What each may have given up for the marriage

(4) What money or property each brought into the
marriage • • • •
(6)
The relative ability,
of the parties • •
(7)

training and education

The duration of the marriage

(8)
The present income of the parties and the
property acquired during the marriage • •
(14) Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care
which may have been given to the spouse or others
(15) The present standards of living and needs of
each including the cost of living • •
236 P. 2d at 1070.

Application of these factors to the present case

clearly demonstrates the necessity of a substantial alimony award in
favor of Mrs. Warren.

At the time of the marriage, Mr. Warren had
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little education and little earning power.

As a result of Mrs. Warren's

financial abilities, he was able to obtain a professional education and
dramatically increase his earning potential.

It was

~1rs.

Warren who

brought into the marriage over $200, 000 worth of property, which has
been relied upon heavily by the parties during the marriage, literally
to provide food and shelter.
thirty-years' duration.

This was a long-term marriage of almost

The present earning capabilities of the parties

reflect their sacrifices and achievements during the marriage:
Mrs. Warren, who remained at home, raising a family and caring for the
home, has no employable skills; whereas Mr. Warren, who financed a
professional education through his wife's inheritance, now has a
lucrative job and enjoys substantial earning capabilities.

The parties'

most substantial assets (the home and its furnishings) were acquired
with Mrs. Warren's inheritance.

It was her inheritance that was used to

I

make a substantial downpayment on the parties' second home, the proceed!!
from the sale of which were used to purchase their present home.

It is

Mrs. Warren's inherited antiques and furnishings that have furnished the
present home.

Equally important, it was Mrs. Warren who supported the

household and provided her husband with an education, both of which
permitted Mr. Warren to amass a considerable sum in investments, all of
which were awarded to him.
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The modest and very short-term alimony awarded by the trial
court, particularly when taken together with the property distribution
effected, constitutes an abuse of discretion and a gross injustice to
\!rs. Warren.

POINT 11.

THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION EFFECTED BY

THE TRIAL COURT IS INEQUITABLE.

In an attempt to justify an inequitable distribution of the
parties' properties, Mr. Warren relies upon grossly inflated values.
His

testimony, accepted by the trial court, was almost $20, 000 above the

highest amounts testified to by his "experts".

The values established

by these "experts" were, however, not fair market values, but

replacement cost values.

The replacement cost of an item is not an

accurate indicator of its value or worth.

When the question is the

fairness of the distribution of the parties' properties, it is not
relevant how much it would cost either party to replace the property.
What is relevant is the actual value of the property; that is to say
what is the actual worth of the property received by each of the
parties.

The trial court abused its discretion in valuing the property

awarded to I\1rs. Warren on the basis of the replacement cost of those
items.
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The trial court also abused its discretion in failing to
reimburse Mrs. Warren for her tremendous contributions to the assets
acquired during the marriage.

This Court has, in domestic relations

actions, long recognized and adhered to the principle that logic and
equity both compel restoration or reimbursement to a spouse for value
brought into the marriage, whether from pre-marital sources or
inheritances.

For example, in Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 112 Utah 31,

184 P. 2d 670 (1947), this Court was faced with the dissolution of a
relatively short-term marriage between older persons.

The major asset

of the parties was a home, which had been purchased shortly after their
marriage.

The evidence demonstrated that while the husband had

purchased the residence, the wife had made significant contibutions from
her pre-marital funds.
the husband.

The trial court awarded the house exclusively to

In reversing this decision, this Court observed:

The [husband] testified that he paid the original
purchase price [for the home], but the testimony of
[the wife] shows that some of her funds were used
for remodeling the house, and that she did
considerable work to aid in the improvement of the
property to make the house liveable.
184 P.2d at 672.

Based upon these facts, this Court held that the trial

court had erred in not properly reimbursing both spouses for their
respective contributions to the marital estate:
We think that a more equitable division of the
property than made below is suggested by the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

T!

record, whereby [the wife] would receive the
benefit of the value which she contributed to the
realty.
The value of the real estate should
therefore be determined and [the wife] should be
awarded one-half of the market value in excess of
the original price; and [the husband] should be
permitted either to pay [the wife] one-half of such
enhanced value retain the property, or the property
should be sold under court order and after reimbursing [the husband] for the amount of the
original purchase price which he testified that he
paid, the balance, after deducting the costs of
sale, should be divided equally.
Id. (emphasis added).

In the present action, the trial court wholly

overlooked the fact that the parties' equity in their present home was
attributable in large measure to the payment against its purchase price
of the proceeds from the parties' second home in Texas.

The very

substantial downpayment on that home had been made solely from
\!rs. Warren's inherited funds.
More recently, the same principle was applied by this Court in
Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697 (Utah 1974).

Before the court in that

case was a long-term marriage between relatively young parties.
Nevertheless, this Court again articulated and approved the principle
that the spouses' respective contributions to the marital estate should
be reimbursed before the ultimate division of the property.

The trial

court in Searle found that the husband had brought to the marriage real
and personal property with an aggregate value of approximately $50,000.

The trial court then proceeded to award to the husband "assets
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equivalent in value to the $50, 000 that he owned at the time of the
I

marriage."

522 P. 2d at 698.

On appeal, this Court found that the trial

j

court had acted properly and affirmed the property distribution
fashioned by the trial court.

522 P.2d at 700.

In Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 0973),
Court again noted that "the source of the assets" was one of the factors
to be take into consideration in effecting a property distribution.

In

that case, substantially all of the assets had come from gifts from the
wife's family; however, it was throur,h the husband's "careful and
prudent investment" of those assets that the parties' substantial estate
was developed.

Even though in that case (directly contrary to the case

now before this Court) it was the husband's talents that had caused the
assets contributed by the wife to increase dramatically in value, this
Court held that it was appropriate to award approximately two-thirds of
the marital property to the wife.

A fortiori in a case such as the

present where the husband's talents have not been used to obtain an
increase in the inherited property, the trial court must be particularly
careful to restore to the wife her contributions from inherited
property.

Merely awarding to

~1rs.

Warren (as the trial court did) the

remaining principal of her inheritance does nbt reimburse her for the
vast amounts she has contributed to the marriage.

The trial court

abused its discretion in refusing to award to ~1rs. Warren additional
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L

r

property to compensate her for her contributions and then compounded
al

that error by utilizing grossly inflated replacement cost values
proffered by the husband.
Most recently, this Court has again emphasized the necessity

h:

of the reimbursement to a spouse of his or her contribution to the
marriage from pre-marital assets.

In Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d

326 (Utah 1980), this Court first made clear that the major asset of the

marriage had been acquired with funds brought to the marriage by the
wife.

In fashioning its property distribution, the trial court

reimbursed to her, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the funds she had
contributed from pre-marital assets.

The trial court then distributed

the remaining equity in the assets on a percentage basis, with
approximately three-quarters of the equity going to the wife.

On

appeal, this Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was well
within its discretion:
It was

not unreasonable for the court to permit
[the wife] to withdraw from the marital property
the equivalent of those assets [she] brought into
the marriage.
All that may be considered to be
marital property acquired through the joint efforts
of the parties was therefore the proceeds [sic]
from the sale of the St. George home over and above
its purchase price [which had been contributed
exclusively by the wife].
610 P. 2d at 328.

Having contributed a substantial amount of money to

this marriage from funds received through inheritances from her family,
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appellant is entitled to the reimbursement of those funds, together Witt,
an equitable share of the appreciation in value of those funds and the
other marital assets.
In its adherence to the proposition that a spouse is entitled
to the reimbursement of assets contributed to the marriage, this Court
is not alone.

For example, the Montana Supreme Court recently held in

1

Herron v. Herron, 608 P.2d 97 (Mont. 1980), that the trial court had
seriously abused its discretion in failing to distribute additional
property to the wife in order to restore to her the substantial
contributions to the marriage that she had made from funds received as
gifts and inheritances from her wealthy father.

The trial court had

divided the property equally between the spouses.

In reversing this

distribution, the Montana Supreme Court noted:
The inequity of the 50 / 50 property
distribution
becomes
apparent
after
considering
the
source
of
the
marital
assets of the parties.
Almost all of the
property accumulated by the Herrons can
be traced to gifts or bequests from the
[wife's father].

Given
the
fact
that
most
of
the
marital assets were accumulatEld via gifts
from Mrs. Herron's father, [the husband's]
contributions to the marriage from other
sources
would
have
to
substantially
outweigh Mrs. Herron's to render equitable
a
50 / 50
distribution
of
the
couple's
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1

assets.
here ••

That

simply

is

not

the

case

Both of the parties here should share
equally in the portion of the value of the
gift property attributable to contribution
from the marriage and appreciation during
the marriage.
The Herrons should not,
however, share equally in the total value
of the property since the marital assets
came to the marriage principally as gifts
for Mrs. Herron's benefit.
608 P. 2d at 100-02 (emphasis added).

Similarly, the Montana Supreme

Court held in Balsam v. Balsam, 589 P.2d 652 (Mont. 1979), that the
district court had properly reimbursed to the husband funds that he had
contributed to the marriage from his pre-marital assets.

In so holding,

the Montana Supreme court approved the property distribution fashioned
by

the trial court even though it gave to the wife only $50, 000 from the

quarter million dollars in assets owned by the parties at the time of
their divorce.
In the present case, Mrs. Warren contributed freely to the
marriage from her substantial inheritances.

The trial court has not

only failed to reimburse her for those contributions, it has compounded
its error by placing a totally unrealistic value on the property
distributed to ~1rs. Warren.

The trial court blindly accepted

self-serving values offered by the husband which were both improperly
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based upon replacement cost and greatly in excess even of the values
speculatively offered by his own "experts".

CONCLUSION
During the tenure of this marriage, which endured for more
than a quarter century, Mrs. Warren made it financially possible for her
husband to obtain a professional education.

Having provided a fine

education for her husband, Mrs. Warren remained at home, where she
dutifully raised their family and kept house.

Although she had financea

a professional education for her husband, she did not have the
opportunity to gain any employable skills herself.

Now, almost 50 years

of age and with a chronic health problem of her hands, she has been
compelled by the small and very short-term alimony award of the trial
court to do that which she has never done before--to seek employment
order to provide for her support, or to dissipate the legacy which woulO
have provided for her retirement.
Such a result is as unfair and inequitable as it is
unrealistic and unwarranted.

This Court has consistently adhered to

just proposition that it is the function of alimony to support a woman
at that standard of living to which she has 'become accustomed during
marriage.

Not only has Mrs. Warren not been forced to seek employment'I

during her marriage, she is now at a stage of life and health where it
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is unrealistic for her to do so.

By failing to recognize and deal with

these realities, the district court has abused its discretion and
misapplied Utah law.
During her marriage,

~.1rs.

Warren not only financed an

education for her husband, but she generously contributed from her
inheritances from the family finances.

It was through her substantial

contributions of capital that the parties' home was acquired and
financed and many of the daily expenses were met.

The district court

has failed not only to recognize and reimburse adequately these
contributions, it has compounded this error through the blind acceptance
of grossly overstated values proposed by the husband for the property
actually distributed to Mrs. Warren.

The husband's valuation of these

items is substantially in excess even of the amounts speculatively
testified to by the so-called "experts" who appeared at trial.

More

fundamentally, even these values were based upon replacement cost of the
items concerned; no effort was made by any witness--except Mrs. Warren
herself--to evaluate the property on the basis of its actual present
market value.

In so doing, the trial court has misapplied the law and

abused its discretion resulting in a property distribution grossly
unfair to Mrs. Warren.
This case must be remanded to the district court so that the
support and property distribution aspects of this divorce action may be
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properly considered and a decree be entered in accordance with the
principles so frequently articulated by this Court.
RESEPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ ~day of March, 1982,

DART

&

STEGALL
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day of March, 1982, I placed with

The Runner Service two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to be
delivered to Nicolaas de Jonge, Suite 14, Intrade Building, 1399 South
700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 48105.
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